mirror of
https://github.com/MikroWizard/mikroman.git
synced 2025-07-15 16:34:32 +02:00
587 lines
22 KiB
Python
587 lines
22 KiB
Python
# This library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
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# modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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# License as published by the Free Software Foundation, either
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# version 3 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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# This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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# Lesser General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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# License along with this library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/> or <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl.txt>.
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import struct
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import random
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import re
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import binascii
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from socket import gethostname
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from . import des
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NTLM_NegotiateUnicode = 0x00000001
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NTLM_NegotiateOEM = 0x00000002
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NTLM_RequestTarget = 0x00000004
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NTLM_Unknown9 = 0x00000008
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NTLM_NegotiateSign = 0x00000010
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NTLM_NegotiateSeal = 0x00000020
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NTLM_NegotiateDatagram = 0x00000040
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NTLM_NegotiateLanManagerKey = 0x00000080
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NTLM_Unknown8 = 0x00000100
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NTLM_NegotiateNTLM = 0x00000200
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NTLM_NegotiateNTOnly = 0x00000400
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NTLM_Anonymous = 0x00000800
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NTLM_NegotiateOemDomainSupplied = 0x00001000
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NTLM_NegotiateOemWorkstationSupplied = 0x00002000
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NTLM_Unknown6 = 0x00004000
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NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign = 0x00008000
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NTLM_TargettypeDomain = 0x00010000
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NTLM_TargettypeServer = 0x00020000
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NTLM_TargettypeShare = 0x00040000
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NTLM_NegotiateExtendedSecurity = 0x00080000
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NTLM_NegotiateIdentify = 0x00100000
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NTLM_Unknown5 = 0x00200000
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NTLM_RequestNonNTSessionKey = 0x00400000
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NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo = 0x00800000
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NTLM_Unknown4 = 0x01000000
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NTLM_NegotiateVersion = 0x02000000
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NTLM_Unknown3 = 0x04000000
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NTLM_Unknown2 = 0x08000000
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NTLM_Unknown1 = 0x10000000
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NTLM_Negotiate128 = 0x20000000
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NTLM_NegotiateKeyExchange = 0x40000000
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NTLM_Negotiate56 = 0x80000000
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# we send these flags with our type 1 message
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NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS = (
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NTLM_NegotiateUnicode
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| NTLM_NegotiateOEM
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| NTLM_RequestTarget
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| NTLM_NegotiateNTLM
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| NTLM_NegotiateOemDomainSupplied
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| NTLM_NegotiateOemWorkstationSupplied
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| NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign
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| NTLM_NegotiateExtendedSecurity
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| NTLM_NegotiateVersion
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| NTLM_Negotiate128
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| NTLM_Negotiate56
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)
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NTLM_TYPE2_FLAGS = (
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NTLM_NegotiateUnicode
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| NTLM_RequestTarget
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| NTLM_NegotiateNTLM
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| NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign
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| NTLM_NegotiateExtendedSecurity
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| NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo
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| NTLM_NegotiateVersion
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| NTLM_Negotiate128
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| NTLM_Negotiate56
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)
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NTLM_MsvAvEOL = 0 # Indicates that this is the last AV_PAIR in the list. AvLen MUST be 0. This type of information MUST be present in the AV pair list.
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NTLM_MsvAvNbComputerName = 1 # The server's NetBIOS computer name. The name MUST be in Unicode, and is not null-terminated. This type of information MUST be present in the AV_pair list.
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NTLM_MsvAvNbDomainName = 2 # The server's NetBIOS domain name. The name MUST be in Unicode, and is not null-terminated. This type of information MUST be present in the AV_pair list.
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NTLM_MsvAvDnsComputerName = 3 # The server's Active Directory DNS computer name. The name MUST be in Unicode, and is not null-terminated.
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NTLM_MsvAvDnsDomainName = 4 # The server's Active Directory DNS domain name. The name MUST be in Unicode, and is not null-terminated.
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NTLM_MsvAvDnsTreeName = 5 # The server's Active Directory (AD) DNS forest tree name. The name MUST be in Unicode, and is not null-terminated.
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NTLM_MsvAvFlags = 6 # A field containing a 32-bit value indicating server or client configuration. 0x00000001: indicates to the client that the account authentication is constrained. 0x00000002: indicates that the client is providing message integrity in the MIC field (section 2.2.1.3) in the AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE.
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NTLM_MsvAvTimestamp = 7 # A FILETIME structure ([MS-DTYP] section 2.3.1) in little-endian byte order that contains the server local time.<12>
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NTLM_MsAvRestrictions = 8 # A Restriction_Encoding structure (section 2.2.2.2). The Value field contains a structure representing the integrity level of the security principal, as well as a MachineID created at computer startup to identify the calling machine. <13>
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"""
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utility functions for Microsoft NTLM authentication
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References:
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[MS-NLMP]: NT LAN Manager (NTLM) Authentication Protocol Specification
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http://download.microsoft.com/download/a/e/6/ae6e4142-aa58-45c6-8dcf-a657e5900cd3/%5BMS-NLMP%5D.pdf
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[MS-NTHT]: NTLM Over HTTP Protocol Specification
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http://download.microsoft.com/download/a/e/6/ae6e4142-aa58-45c6-8dcf-a657e5900cd3/%5BMS-NTHT%5D.pdf
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Cntlm Authentication Proxy
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http://cntlm.awk.cz/
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NTLM Authorization Proxy Server
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http://sourceforge.net/projects/ntlmaps/
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Optimized Attack for NTLM2 Session Response
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http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-asia-04/bh-jp-04-pdfs/bh-jp-04-seki.pdf
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"""
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def dump_NegotiateFlags(NegotiateFlags):
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateUnicode:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateUnicode set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateOEM:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateOEM set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_RequestTarget:
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print("NTLM_RequestTarget set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown9:
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print("NTLM_Unknown9 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateSign:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateSign set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateSeal:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateSeal set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateDatagram:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateDatagram set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateLanManagerKey:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateLanManagerKey set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown8:
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print("NTLM_Unknown8 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateNTLM:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateNTLM set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateNTOnly:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateNTOnly set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Anonymous:
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print("NTLM_Anonymous set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateOemDomainSupplied:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateOemDomainSupplied set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateOemWorkstationSupplied:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateOemWorkstationSupplied set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown6:
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print("NTLM_Unknown6 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_TargettypeDomain:
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print("NTLM_TargettypeDomain set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_TargettypeServer:
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print("NTLM_TargettypeServer set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_TargettypeShare:
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print("NTLM_TargettypeShare set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateExtendedSecurity:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateExtendedSecurity set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateIdentify:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateIdentify set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown5:
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print("NTLM_Unknown5 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_RequestNonNTSessionKey:
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print("NTLM_RequestNonNTSessionKey set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown4:
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print("NTLM_Unknown4 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateVersion:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateVersion set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown3:
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print("NTLM_Unknown3 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown2:
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print("NTLM_Unknown2 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Unknown1:
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print("NTLM_Unknown1 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Negotiate128:
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print("NTLM_Negotiate128 set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateKeyExchange:
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print("NTLM_NegotiateKeyExchange set")
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_Negotiate56:
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print("NTLM_Negotiate56 set")
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def create_NTLM_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(user, type1_flags=NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS):
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BODY_LENGTH = 40
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Payload_start = BODY_LENGTH # in bytes
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protocol = b"NTLMSSP\0" # name
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type = struct.pack("<I", 1) # type 1
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flags = struct.pack("<I", type1_flags)
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Workstation = bytes(gethostname().upper(), "ascii")
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user_parts = user.split("\\", 1)
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DomainName = bytes(user_parts[0].upper(), "ascii")
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EncryptedRandomSessionKey = ""
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WorkstationLen = struct.pack("<H", len(Workstation))
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WorkstationMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(Workstation))
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WorkstationBufferOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(Workstation)
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DomainNameLen = struct.pack("<H", len(DomainName))
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DomainNameMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(DomainName))
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DomainNameBufferOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(DomainName)
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ProductMajorVersion = struct.pack("<B", 5)
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ProductMinorVersion = struct.pack("<B", 1)
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ProductBuild = struct.pack("<H", 2600)
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VersionReserved1 = struct.pack("<B", 0)
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VersionReserved2 = struct.pack("<B", 0)
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VersionReserved3 = struct.pack("<B", 0)
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NTLMRevisionCurrent = struct.pack("<B", 15)
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msg1 = (
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protocol
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+ type
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+ flags
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+ DomainNameLen
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+ DomainNameMaxLen
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+ DomainNameBufferOffset
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+ WorkstationLen
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+ WorkstationMaxLen
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+ WorkstationBufferOffset
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+ ProductMajorVersion
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+ ProductMinorVersion
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+ ProductBuild
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+ VersionReserved1
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+ VersionReserved2
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+ VersionReserved3
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+ NTLMRevisionCurrent
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)
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assert BODY_LENGTH == len(msg1), "BODY_LENGTH: %d != msg1: %d" % (
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BODY_LENGTH,
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len(msg1),
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)
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msg1 += Workstation + DomainName
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msg1 = base64.b64encode(msg1)
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return msg1.decode()
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def parse_NTLM_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(msg2):
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""""""
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msg2 = base64.b64decode(bytes(msg2, "ascii"))
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Signature = msg2[0:8]
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msg_type = struct.unpack("<I", msg2[8:12])[0]
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assert msg_type == 2
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TargetNameLen = struct.unpack("<H", msg2[12:14])[0]
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TargetNameMaxLen = struct.unpack("<H", msg2[14:16])[0]
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TargetNameOffset = struct.unpack("<I", msg2[16:20])[0]
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TargetName = msg2[TargetNameOffset : TargetNameOffset + TargetNameMaxLen]
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NegotiateFlags = struct.unpack("<I", msg2[20:24])[0]
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ServerChallenge = msg2[24:32]
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if NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo:
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Reserved = msg2[32:40]
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TargetInfoLen = struct.unpack("<H", msg2[40:42])[0]
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TargetInfoMaxLen = struct.unpack("<H", msg2[42:44])[0]
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TargetInfoOffset = struct.unpack("<I", msg2[44:48])[0]
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TargetInfo = msg2[TargetInfoOffset : TargetInfoOffset + TargetInfoLen]
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i = 0
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TimeStamp = "\0" * 8
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while i < TargetInfoLen:
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AvId = struct.unpack("<H", TargetInfo[i : i + 2])[0]
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AvLen = struct.unpack("<H", TargetInfo[i + 2 : i + 4])[0]
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AvValue = TargetInfo[i + 4 : i + 4 + AvLen]
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i = i + 4 + AvLen
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if AvId == NTLM_MsvAvTimestamp:
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TimeStamp = AvValue
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# ~ print AvId, AvValue.decode('utf-16')
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return (ServerChallenge, NegotiateFlags)
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def create_NTLM_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(nonce, user, domain, password, NegotiateFlags):
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""""""
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is_unicode = NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateUnicode
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is_NegotiateExtendedSecurity = NegotiateFlags & NTLM_NegotiateExtendedSecurity
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flags = struct.pack("<I", NTLM_TYPE2_FLAGS)
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BODY_LENGTH = 72
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Payload_start = BODY_LENGTH # in bytes
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Workstation = bytes(gethostname().upper(), "ascii")
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DomainName = bytes(domain.upper(), "ascii")
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UserName = bytes(user, "ascii")
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EncryptedRandomSessionKey = b""
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if is_unicode:
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Workstation = bytes(gethostname().upper(), "utf-16-le")
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DomainName = bytes(domain.upper(), "utf-16-le")
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UserName = bytes(user, "utf-16-le")
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EncryptedRandomSessionKey = bytes("", "utf-16-le")
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LmChallengeResponse = calc_resp(create_LM_hashed_password_v1(password), nonce)
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NtChallengeResponse = calc_resp(create_NT_hashed_password_v1(password), nonce)
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if is_NegotiateExtendedSecurity:
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pwhash = create_NT_hashed_password_v1(password, UserName, DomainName)
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ClientChallenge = b""
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for i in range(8):
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ClientChallenge += bytes((random.getrandbits(8),))
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(NtChallengeResponse, LmChallengeResponse) = ntlm2sr_calc_resp(
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pwhash, nonce, ClientChallenge
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) # ='\x39 e3 f4 cd 59 c5 d8 60')
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Signature = b"NTLMSSP\0"
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Messagetype = struct.pack("<I", 3) # type 3
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DomainNameLen = struct.pack("<H", len(DomainName))
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DomainNameMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(DomainName))
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DomainNameOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(DomainName)
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UserNameLen = struct.pack("<H", len(UserName))
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UserNameMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(UserName))
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UserNameOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(UserName)
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WorkstationLen = struct.pack("<H", len(Workstation))
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WorkstationMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(Workstation))
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WorkstationOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(Workstation)
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LmChallengeResponseLen = struct.pack("<H", len(LmChallengeResponse))
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LmChallengeResponseMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(LmChallengeResponse))
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LmChallengeResponseOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(LmChallengeResponse)
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NtChallengeResponseLen = struct.pack("<H", len(NtChallengeResponse))
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NtChallengeResponseMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(NtChallengeResponse))
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NtChallengeResponseOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(NtChallengeResponse)
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EncryptedRandomSessionKeyLen = struct.pack("<H", len(EncryptedRandomSessionKey))
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EncryptedRandomSessionKeyMaxLen = struct.pack("<H", len(EncryptedRandomSessionKey))
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EncryptedRandomSessionKeyOffset = struct.pack("<I", Payload_start)
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Payload_start += len(EncryptedRandomSessionKey)
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NegotiateFlags = flags
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ProductMajorVersion = struct.pack("<B", 5)
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ProductMinorVersion = struct.pack("<B", 1)
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ProductBuild = struct.pack("<H", 2600)
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VersionReserved1 = struct.pack("<B", 0)
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VersionReserved2 = struct.pack("<B", 0)
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VersionReserved3 = struct.pack("<B", 0)
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NTLMRevisionCurrent = struct.pack("<B", 15)
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MIC = struct.pack("<IIII", 0, 0, 0, 0)
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msg3 = (
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Signature
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+ Messagetype
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+ LmChallengeResponseLen
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+ LmChallengeResponseMaxLen
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+ LmChallengeResponseOffset
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+ NtChallengeResponseLen
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+ NtChallengeResponseMaxLen
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+ NtChallengeResponseOffset
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+ DomainNameLen
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+ DomainNameMaxLen
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+ DomainNameOffset
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+ UserNameLen
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+ UserNameMaxLen
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+ UserNameOffset
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+ WorkstationLen
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+ WorkstationMaxLen
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+ WorkstationOffset
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+ EncryptedRandomSessionKeyLen
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+ EncryptedRandomSessionKeyMaxLen
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+ EncryptedRandomSessionKeyOffset
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+ NegotiateFlags
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+ ProductMajorVersion
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+ ProductMinorVersion
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+ ProductBuild
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+ VersionReserved1
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+ VersionReserved2
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+ VersionReserved3
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+ NTLMRevisionCurrent
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)
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assert BODY_LENGTH == len(msg3), "BODY_LENGTH: %d != msg3: %d" % (
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BODY_LENGTH,
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len(msg3),
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)
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Payload = (
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DomainName
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+ UserName
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+ Workstation
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+ LmChallengeResponse
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+ NtChallengeResponse
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+ EncryptedRandomSessionKey
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)
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msg3 += Payload
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msg3 = base64.b64encode(msg3)
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return msg3.decode()
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def calc_resp(password_hash, server_challenge):
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"""calc_resp generates the LM response given a 16-byte password hash and the
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challenge from the type-2 message.
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@param password_hash
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16-byte password hash
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@param server_challenge
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8-byte challenge from type-2 message
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returns
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24-byte buffer to contain the LM response upon return
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"""
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# padding with zeros to make the hash 21 bytes long
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password_hash = password_hash + b"\0" * (21 - len(password_hash))
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res = b""
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dobj = des.DES(password_hash[0:7])
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res = res + dobj.encrypt(server_challenge[0:8])
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dobj = des.DES(password_hash[7:14])
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res = res + dobj.encrypt(server_challenge[0:8])
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dobj = des.DES(password_hash[14:21])
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res = res + dobj.encrypt(server_challenge[0:8])
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return res
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def ComputeResponse(
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ResponseKeyNT,
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ResponseKeyLM,
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ServerChallenge,
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ServerName,
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ClientChallenge="\xaa" * 8,
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Time="\0" * 8,
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):
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LmChallengeResponse = (
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hmac.new(ResponseKeyLM, ServerChallenge + ClientChallenge).digest()
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+ ClientChallenge
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)
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Responserversion = b"\x01"
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HiResponserversion = b"\x01"
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temp = (
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Responserversion
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+ HiResponserversion
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+ b"\0" * 6
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+ Time
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+ ClientChallenge
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+ b"\0" * 4
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+ ServerChallenge
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+ b"\0" * 4
|
|
)
|
|
NTProofStr = hmac.new(ResponseKeyNT, ServerChallenge + temp).digest()
|
|
NtChallengeResponse = NTProofStr + temp
|
|
|
|
SessionBaseKey = hmac.new(ResponseKeyNT, NTProofStr).digest()
|
|
return (NtChallengeResponse, LmChallengeResponse)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def ntlm2sr_calc_resp(ResponseKeyNT, ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge=b"\xaa" * 8):
|
|
import hashlib
|
|
|
|
LmChallengeResponse = ClientChallenge + b"\0" * 16
|
|
sess = hashlib.md5(ServerChallenge + ClientChallenge).digest()
|
|
NtChallengeResponse = calc_resp(ResponseKeyNT, sess[0:8])
|
|
return (NtChallengeResponse, LmChallengeResponse)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_LM_hashed_password_v1(passwd):
|
|
"setup LanManager password"
|
|
"create LanManager hashed password"
|
|
# if the passwd provided is already a hash, we just return the first half
|
|
if re.match(r"^[\w]{32}:[\w]{32}$", passwd):
|
|
return binascii.unhexlify(passwd.split(":")[0])
|
|
|
|
# fix the password length to 14 bytes
|
|
passwd = passwd.upper()
|
|
lm_pw = passwd + "\0" * (14 - len(passwd))
|
|
lm_pw = bytes(passwd[0:14], "utf8")
|
|
|
|
# do hash
|
|
magic_str = b"KGS!@#$%" # page 57 in [MS-NLMP]
|
|
|
|
res = b""
|
|
dobj = des.DES(lm_pw[0:7])
|
|
res = res + dobj.encrypt(magic_str)
|
|
|
|
dobj = des.DES(lm_pw[7:14])
|
|
res = res + dobj.encrypt(magic_str)
|
|
|
|
return res
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_NT_hashed_password_v1(passwd, user=None, domain=None):
|
|
"create NT hashed password"
|
|
# if the passwd provided is already a hash, we just return the second half
|
|
if re.match(r"^[\w]{32}:[\w]{32}$", passwd):
|
|
return binascii.unhexlify(passwd.split(":")[1])
|
|
|
|
digest = hashlib.new("md4", passwd.encode("utf-16le")).digest()
|
|
return digest
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_NT_hashed_password_v2(passwd, user, domain):
|
|
"create NT hashed password"
|
|
digest = create_NT_hashed_password_v1(passwd)
|
|
|
|
return hmac.new(digest, (user.upper() + domain).encode("utf-16le")).digest()
|
|
return digest
|
|
|
|
|
|
def create_sessionbasekey(password):
|
|
return hashlib.new("md4", create_NT_hashed_password_v1(password)).digest()
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
from binascii import unhexlify, hexlify
|
|
|
|
def ByteToHex(byteStr):
|
|
"""
|
|
Convert a byte string to it's hex string representation e.g. for output.
|
|
"""
|
|
return " ".join(["%02X" % x for x in byteStr])
|
|
|
|
def HexToByte(hexStr):
|
|
"""
|
|
Convert a string hex byte values into a byte string. The Hex Byte values may
|
|
or may not be space separated.
|
|
"""
|
|
hexStr = "".join(hexStr.split(" "))
|
|
|
|
return unhexlify(hexStr)
|
|
|
|
ServerChallenge = HexToByte("01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef")
|
|
ClientChallenge = b"\xaa" * 8
|
|
Time = b"\x00" * 8
|
|
Workstation = "COMPUTER".encode("utf-16-le")
|
|
ServerName = "Server".encode("utf-16-le")
|
|
User = "User"
|
|
Domain = "Domain"
|
|
Password = "Password"
|
|
RandomSessionKey = "\55" * 16
|
|
assert HexToByte(
|
|
"e5 2c ac 67 41 9a 9a 22 4a 3b 10 8f 3f a6 cb 6d"
|
|
) == create_LM_hashed_password_v1(
|
|
Password
|
|
) # [MS-NLMP] page 72
|
|
assert HexToByte(
|
|
"a4 f4 9c 40 65 10 bd ca b6 82 4e e7 c3 0f d8 52"
|
|
) == create_NT_hashed_password_v1(
|
|
Password
|
|
) # [MS-NLMP] page 73
|
|
assert HexToByte(
|
|
"d8 72 62 b0 cd e4 b1 cb 74 99 be cc cd f1 07 84"
|
|
) == create_sessionbasekey(Password)
|
|
assert HexToByte(
|
|
"67 c4 30 11 f3 02 98 a2 ad 35 ec e6 4f 16 33 1c 44 bd be d9 27 84 1f 94"
|
|
) == calc_resp(create_NT_hashed_password_v1(Password), ServerChallenge)
|
|
assert HexToByte(
|
|
"98 de f7 b8 7f 88 aa 5d af e2 df 77 96 88 a1 72 de f1 1c 7d 5c cd ef 13"
|
|
) == calc_resp(create_LM_hashed_password_v1(Password), ServerChallenge)
|
|
|
|
(NTLMv1Response, LMv1Response) = ntlm2sr_calc_resp(
|
|
create_NT_hashed_password_v1(Password), ServerChallenge, ClientChallenge
|
|
)
|
|
assert (
|
|
HexToByte(
|
|
"aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00"
|
|
)
|
|
== LMv1Response
|
|
) # [MS-NLMP] page 75
|
|
assert (
|
|
HexToByte(
|
|
"75 37 f8 03 ae 36 71 28 ca 45 82 04 bd e7 ca f8 1e 97 ed 26 83 26 72 32"
|
|
)
|
|
== NTLMv1Response
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
assert HexToByte(
|
|
"0c 86 8a 40 3b fd 7a 93 a3 00 1e f2 2e f0 2e 3f"
|
|
) == create_NT_hashed_password_v2(
|
|
Password, User, Domain
|
|
) # [MS-NLMP] page 76
|
|
ResponseKeyLM = ResponseKeyNT = create_NT_hashed_password_v2(Password, User, Domain)
|
|
(NTLMv2Response, LMv2Response) = ComputeResponse(
|
|
ResponseKeyNT, ResponseKeyLM, ServerChallenge, ServerName, ClientChallenge, Time
|
|
)
|
|
assert (
|
|
HexToByte(
|
|
"86 c3 50 97 ac 9c ec 10 25 54 76 4a 57 cc cc 19 aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa"
|
|
)
|
|
== LMv2Response
|
|
) # [MS-NLMP] page 76
|
|
assert (
|
|
"TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB7IIogYABgAwAAAACAAIACgAAAAFASgKAAAAD1dTMDQyMzc4RE9NQUlO"
|
|
== create_NTLM_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE("DOMAIN\\User")
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# expected failure
|
|
# According to the spec in section '3.3.2 NTLM v2 Authentication' the NTLMv2Response should be longer than the value given on page 77 (this suggests a mistake in the spec)
|
|
# ~ assert HexToByte("68 cd 0a b8 51 e5 1c 96 aa bc 92 7b eb ef 6a 1c") == NTLMv2Response, "\nExpected: 68 cd 0a b8 51 e5 1c 96 aa bc 92 7b eb ef 6a 1c\nActual: %s" % ByteToHex(NTLMv2Response) # [MS-NLMP] page 77
|